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method and convention as the exchanged (or involuntarily
converted) property with respect to so much of the taxpayer’s
basis in the acquired property as does not exceed the
taxpayer’s basis in the property given up.10  To the extent
basis in the acquired property exceeds the income tax basis of
the exchanged property, the acquired property is treated as
newly purchased MACRS property.11  Thus, two separate
depreciation deduction schedules are needed—one for the
carryover basis over the remaining recovery period and one
for the portion of the basis attributable to the cash paid which
is depreciated as newly purchased property over the recovery
period for the acquired asset.
Example:  Returning to the above example of a trade of
a 1996 tractor (which had been depreciated down to
$18,000) for a new 2000 tractor with a $92,000 cash
payment, the $18,000 amount continues to be
depreciated as seven-year property beginning with the
date the 1996 tractor was placed in service, using the
depreciation method and convention as had been used
for the 1996 tractor.
The $92,000, less any amount claimed as expense
method depreciation, would be entered for the 2000
tractor as a newly purchased asset.  Thus, the new tractor
would be depreciated under the recovery period,
convention and depreciation method appropriate for a
tractor placed in service on August 1, 2000.  Thus, the
taxpayer’s depreciation schedule would now reflect two
entries.  One entry, in effect, reflects the continuing
depreciation on the tax investment in the 1996 tractor.
The other entry would show the new tax investment in
the 2000 tractor.
Effective date
For acquired MACRS property placed in service on or after
January 3, 2000, the principles in Notice 2000-412 must be
followed.
Property placed in service before that date, for which the
entire basis for the acquired property is treated as newly
purchased property, can continue with that approach.13  Fo
such property to be shifted to Notice 2000-4 principles is a
change of accounting method.14  Those taxpayers who shift to
Notice 2000-4 must have acquired the property in a like-kind
exchange or by involuntary conversion, be presently treating
th  property as newly purchased MACRS property, make the
change for the first or second tax year ending after January 3,
2000, and treat the shift as an automatic change of accounting
m tho .15  If depreciation under Notice 2000-4 results in
more depreciation allowable than what was actually taken,
the difference is a Section 481 adjustment that must be taken
into account under R v. Proc. 99-49.
In conclusion.
The major impact of Notice 2000-417 is likely to be in the
additional complexity in handling entries on the depreciation
schedule.  The Notice will have an impact, also, on the timing
of depreciation deductions, depending upon the facts of each
situation.
FOOTNOTES
1 Notice 2000-4, I.R.B. 2000-3, 1.
2 I.R.C.  § 1031.  See generally 4 Harl, Agricultural Law §
27.03[8][a][ii](2000); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual §
4.02[16](2000).
3 I.R.C. § 1033.  See generally 4 Harl, supra note 2, § 27.04.
4 I.R.C. § 1031(d).  See 4 Harl, supra note 2, § 29.04[1][b].
5 I.R.C. § 179.  See 4 Harl, supra note 2, § 29.05[2][b].
6 See I.R.C. § 179(b)(1) (the maximum expense method
depreciation for 2000 is $20,000).
7 I.R.C. § 1033(a).
8 I.R.C. § 1033(a)(1).
9 I.R.C. § 1033(b).
10 Notice 2000-4, I.R.B. 2000-3, 1.
11 Id.
12 I.R.B. 2000-3, 1.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 See Rev. Proc. 99-49, I.R.B. 1999-52, 725.
16 Id.
17 I.R.B. 2000-3, 1.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE . After losing a Tax Court case which held
that the debtor owed taxes, the debtor married his long-time
companion and executed an antenuptial agreement which
transferred all of the assets of a corporation owned by the
debtor to the debtor’s spouse’s corporation. In return, the
spouse transferred to the debtor debts owed to her by the
debtor. Neither set of assets had much value because the
debtor’s corporation had been incurring substantial losses.
However, because the debtor’s corporation owned the
debtor’s residence and vehicles, the antenuptial agreement
effectively removed from the debtor’s estate all assets
against which the IRS could levy to satisfy the Tax Court
judgment. The IRS petitioned for nondischarge of the debtor
on the tax claims for willful and fraudulent attempt to evade
taxes. The court held that the tax debt was nondischargeable
because the intentional and voluntary transfer of the debtor’s
assets without adequate consideration to a family member
was a willful and fraudulent attempt to evade taxes. On
appeal, the appellate court initially reversed, holding that,
under In re Haas, 48 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 1994), the mere
non-payment of taxes did not amount to a willful attempt to
evade taxes under Section 523(a)(1)(C). The appellate court
had expressed reservations about the wisdom of Haas under
the facts of this case but felt compelled to follow Haas. On
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rehearing en banc, the appellate court affirmed the District
and Bankruptcy Courts, holding that Haas was still correct
but reviewed the case using the test of whether the debtor
knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally violated a duty
under the law. The court held that the evidence of the
debtor’s attempt to hide assets was sufficient that the debtor
voluntarily and intentionally failed to fulfill the duty to pay
the taxes. In re Griffith, 206 F.3d 1389 (11th Cir. 2000),
rev’g on reh’g en banc, 174 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 1999),
rev’g, 210 B.R. 216 (S.D. Fla. 1997), aff’g, 161 B.R. 727
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
The debtor failed to file and pay income taxes for 10 years,
during which the debtor suffered from alcoholism. The court
found that the debtor did no affirmative acts to avoid
payment of the taxes but that the debtor was merely
indifferent to paying the taxes, a condition caused by the
alcoholism. Once the debtor sought treatment for the
alcoholism, the debtor fully cooperated with the IRS and
filed all of the unfiled returns. The court held that the taxes
were dischargeable because the debtor did not willfully
attempt to evade payment of the taxes. The court reiterated
the holding in I  re Haas, 48 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 1997) that
the mere failure to file and pay taxes when able to do so was
not sufficient to render the taxes nondischargeable. In r
Fretz, 248 B.R. 183 (N.D. Ala. 2000), aff’g 239 B.R. 605
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999).
Although the debtor had filed income tax returns for
several years, the debtor stopped filing returns and paying
taxes after deciding that the IRS had no authority to collect
taxes. The debtor continued to refuse to file returns or pay
taxes after assessments by the IRS. The debtor attempted to
hide assets from the IRS by using sham trusts and false
business names for bank accounts and avoiding the use of
checks.  Criminal charges were eventually brought against
the debtor who still resisted filing the returns. Eventually the
debtor did file returns but only under court orders. The court
held that the taxes were nondischargeable under Section
523(a)(1)(C) for willfully attempting to evade payment of
taxes. In re May, 247 B.R. 786 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2000).
EARNED INCOME CREDIT . The debtor filed for
Chapter 7 in October 1997 and included an exemption for
the entire 1997 earned income credit. The debtor argued that
the earned income credit was not estate property because the
debtor was not entitled to the credit as of the petition filing.
The court held that the debtor had sufficient interest in the
credit on the petition date to include the credit in estate
property. In re Johnston, 209 F.3d 611 (6th Cir. 2000),
aff’g unrep. D. Ct. dec. aff’g, 222 B.R. 552 (Bankr. 6th
Cir. 1998).
REFUNDS. In a Chief Counsel’s Advice letter, the IRS
discusses the issues involved in whether the IRS may be
ordered to pay individual tax refunds to Chapter 13 trustees.
The letter, however, does not include any of the legal
conclusions reached. CCA Ltr. Rul. 200027049, May 12,
2000.
SETOFF. The debtor filed a Chapter 13 plan which
provided for full payment of an IRS claim for 1996 taxes.
The debtor’s schedules listed a federal tax refund which the
debtor claimed as exempt property. The plan was confirmed
without objection from the IRS but on the very next day, the
IRS filed a motion to offset the tax refund against the 1996
tax claim. The Bankruptcy Court held that the confirmation
of the plan established the rights between the debtor and IRS
and prevented any setoff. The District Court reversed,
hol ing that the provisions of a confirmed plan cannot alter a
creditor’s right of setoff under Section 553.   I re Munson,
248 B.R. 343 (C.D. Ill. 2000), rev’g, 241 B.R. 410 (Bankr.
C.D. Ill. 1999).
TAX LIEN. The debtors filed for Chapter 7 and listed an
IRA as exempt property, although the schedules did not
identify the location of the IRA. The IRS was listed as a
creditor, attended the creditors’ meeting, and did not object
to the exemption schedule. More than 30 days after the
cr ditors’ meeting, the debtors withdrew the IRA funds in
several installments and deposited the funds in several other
accounts. The debtors then used the funds to pay
nondischarged debts, including estimated taxes for the post-
petition tax year. After the debtors received their discharge,
including discharge of taxes for which the IRS filed a tax
lien, th  IRS sought to enforce the tax lien against the IRA
funds, but by the time the IRS traced the funds to the
separate accounts, none of the funds remained in the
accounts. Instead, the accounts had funds only from post-
discharge income of the debtors. The IRS levied against
those funds which were eventually paid to the IRS. The
debtors sought return of the funds, damages, attorney’s fees
and costs. The court held that the levy against post-discharge
funds violated the permanent injunction resulting from the
discharge. The court ordered that the levied funds be
returned to the debtors; however, the court refused to award
any damages or costs. The IRS argued that equitable
principles of tracing and constructive trust should be applied
to allow the recovery of the dispersed IRA funds, which
were subject to the lien, from the post-discharge income,
which was not subject to the lien. The court rejected this
argument because the debtors’ actions were not fraudulent.
In re Wood, 247 B.R. 493 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
ANIMAL WELFARE . The APHIS has announced that it
is considering several changes to the animal welfare
regulations to promote the humane treatment of live animals
used in research, testing, and teaching and to improve the
quality of information reportED to Congress concerning
animal pain and distress. Specifically, APHIS is considering
adding a definition for the term “distress.” Although this
term is used throughout the animal welfare regulations, it is
not defined. APHIS stated that the addition of such a
definition would clarify what is considered to be “distress”
and could help assist research facilities to recognize and
minimize distress in animals in accordance with the Animal
Welfare Act. APHIS is also considering replacing or
modifying the system used to classify animal pain and
distress. Professional standards regarding the recognition
and relief of animal pain and distress have changed
significantly since the establishment of the classification
system. 65 Fed. Reg. 42304 (July 10, 2000).
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has issued interim
regulations amending the catastrophic risk endorsement to
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revise the definition of “approved yield” to allow for the
substitution of 60 percent of the transitional yield, change
the administrative fee from $60 to $100, revise the
requirement that the producer pay the administrative fee, and
remove all references to limited coverage because, as a result
of changes to the subsidy levels and administrative fee, there
is no longer a distinction between limited and additional
coverage. The interim regulations also amend the group risk
plan of insurance regulations to remove all references to
limited coverage because, as a result of changes to the
subsidy levels and administrative fee, there is no longer a
distinction between limited and additional coverage; revise
the definition of “additional coverage” to incorporate limited
coverage; change the administrative fee from $60 to $100
for catastrophic risk protection coverage, remove all
references to administrative fees for limited coverage,
change the administrative fee from $20 to $30 for all
coverages in excess of catastrophic risk protection; and
revise the requirement that the producer pay the
administrative fee. The interim regulations also amend the
common crop insurance regulations to remove all references
to limited coverage because, as a result of changes to the
subsidy levels and administrative fee, there is no longer a
distinction between limited and additional coverage; revise
the definition of “additional coverage” to incorporate limited
coverage and the definition of “approved yield” to allow for
the substitution of 60 percent of the transitional yield;
remove all references to administrative fees for limited
coverage, and change the administrative fee from $20 to $30
for all coverages in excess of catastrophic risk protection;
and revise the requirement that the producer pay the
administrative fee. 65 Fed. Reg. 40483 (June 30, 2000).
The FCIC has announced the approval for reinsurance and
subsidy the insurance of canola/rapeseed, corn, feed barley,
soybeans, sunflowers, spring wheat, and winter wheat in
select states and counties under the Revenue Assurance plan
of insurance for the 2001 crop year. 65 Fed. Reg. 41930
(July 7, 2000).
The FCIC has announced the approval for reinsurance and
subsidy the insurance of corn, grain sorghum, soybeans,
cotton, rice, and wheat in select states and counties under the
Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) plan of insurance submitted
by American Agrisurance (AmAg). 65 Fed. Reg. 41937
(July 7, 2000).
SHARED APPRECIATION AGREEMENTS . The
plaintiff had obtained an emergency farm loan in the 1970s
and had defaulted on the loan in 1988. The plaintiff obtained
loan servicing and signed a shared appreciation agreement
with the FmHA (now FSA). The county office set a
valuation on the plaintiff’s farm property for purposes of
determining the basis for appreciation over the 10 years of
the agreement. In 1998, the 50 percent appreciation payment
came due and the terms of the agreement were audited by
the FSA which determined that the original valuation was
erroneously adjusted upward by the county office. The FSA
ruled that the plaintiff had received “unauthorized
assistance” and increased the amount of appreciation and the
50 percent payment required. The issue in this case was
whether the FSA acted properly in adjusting the initial
valuation of the property. The court held that the regulations
governing shared appreciation agreements provide no
authority for rewriting the agreements but require the FSA to
make a determination of unauthorized assistance and initiate
a separate collection adjudication. Viers v. Glickman, No.
4-99-CV-90431 (S.D. Iowa July 10, 2000).
TOBACCO . The CCC has adopted as final regulations for
the 1999 marketing quota for tobacco:
Kind and Type Quota (Million pounds)
Virgi ia fire-cured(type 21)..............................2 6
Ky-Tenn. fire-cured(types 22-23).......................41.4
Dark air-cured(types 35-36).............................12 8
Virginia sun-cured(type 37).............................0 171
Cigar filler & binder(types 42-44, 53-55)..............4.5
The 1999 tobacco price support levels were as follows:





Cigar filler & binder(types 42-44, 53-55).............123.8
65 Fed. Reg. 41551 (July 6, 2000).
TUBERCULOSIS . The APHIS has issued an interim
regulation changing the status of Michigan from split-state
status to nonmodified accredited status for the entire state.
65 Fed. Reg. 39780 (June 28, 2000).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
EXTENSION OF TIME TO PAY TAX . In a Chief
Counsel’s Advice letter, the IRS ruled that the IRS has the
discretionary authority to require an I.R.C. § 6165 bond but
not an I.R.C. § 6324A special lien as a condition to granting
an extension of time to pay federal estate taxes, under I.R.C.
§ 6166. CCA Ltr. Rul. 200027046, April 26, 2000.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS . The
taxpayer had created three trusts for the taxpayer’s children,
with remainders to grandchildren. The taxpayer filed a gift
tax return but made several errors in the allocation of the
contributions to the trusts which were subject to GSTT and
failed to include a Notice of Allocation of GST Exemption.
However, the return did indicate that the taxpayer intended
to allocate the GST exemption to the trusts such that the
exclusion ratio was zero. The taxpayer made additional
contributions to the trusts five years later and included a late
“protective” allocation of the exemption for the earlier
contributions. The IRS ruled that the initial return
substantially complied with the regulations and that the
taxpayer would be allowed to allocate the portion of the gifts
sufficient to create an exclusion ratio of zero. Ltr. Rul
200027009, March 31, 2000.
After settlement of a suit against the estate, estate property
passed to a grandnephew and grandniece of the decedent.
The parents of the grandnephew and grandniece predeceased
the decedent and the decedent had no other living
descendants. The IRS ruled that the grandnephew and
grandniece would be considered one generation lower than
the decedent for GST purposes. Ltr. Rul. 200026001, Ltr.
Rul. 200026002, Ltr. Rul. 200026003, Ltr. Rul.
200026004, March 3, 2000.
IRA . The decedent died owning two IRAs. The named
beneficiary of the IRAs was the decedent’s estate. The
decedent’s will was made before marriage to the surviving
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spouse and did not contain any bequests to the surviving
spouse. Under state inheritance law, in such cases, the
surviving spouse is entitled to a one-half share of the estate.
The estate distributed one-half of each IRA to the surviving
spouse who contributed the funds to IRAs in the spouse’s
names. The IRS ruled that the IRA funds would be treated as
received from the decedent and not the decedent’s estate;
therefore, the funds would not be included in the surviving
spouse’s income. Ltr. Rul. 200027061, April 12, 2000.
TRUSTS. The IRS has adopted as final regulations
governing application of the grantor trust rules to foreign
trusts with United States persons as beneficiaries. The
regulations provide for taxation of U.S. beneficiaries of
amounts distributed by foreign trusts to intermediaries prior
to being distributed to the U.S. beneficiary. The regulations
remove some foreign trusts from the grantor trust rules in
order to allow taxation of the beneficiary for distributions
from trusts established by foreign persons. 65 Fed  Reg.
41332 (July 5, 2000).
VALUATION . The decedent had created an intervivos
trust with the decedent as income beneficiary and the
decedent’s two children as remainder beneficiaries. The trust
and the children entered into a partnership agreement with
the trust receiving a limited partnership interest in exchange
for contribution of the trust corpus. The limited partnership
interest was divided into two classes, with 60 percent
transferred to the children and 39 percent retained by the
trust. The partnership agreement provided for dissolution of
the partnership if (1) either of the general partners leaves the
partnership and the remaining general partner does not elect
to continue the partnership, or (2) all partners agree in
writing. The general partners cannot withdraw from the
partnership without the consent of the limited partners. The
court held that the facts were similar to those in Kerr v.
Comm’r, 113 T.C. 449 (1999) and the California partnership
law in this case was similar to Texas partnership law in Kerr;
therefore, the court followed the holding in Kerr that the
partnership agreement was not more restrictive than state
law. The court held that the limitations on liquidation
contained in the partnership agreement were not applicable
restrictions within the meaning of I.R.C. § 2704(b) and must
be taken into account in valuing the limited partnership
interests for estate tax purposes. Estate of Harper v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-202.
The decedent’s estate included a 25 percent interest in a
partnership. The estate had valued the interest using
discounts for lack of marketability, lack of control, uncertain
rights, and ownership of an undesirable mix of assets. Under
Texas law and the partnership agreement, the decedent’s
death dissolved the partnership and the estate’s interest in
the partnership became an assignee’s interest. The IRS
argued that the discounts were not applicable because the
estate had the right to a 25 percent interest in the liquidated
partnership assets. The court held that, under Texas law, the
other partners had the right to continue the partnership and
pay the estate the value of the decedent’s interest. The court
held that the value of the decedent’s interest under those
circumstances would be the fair market value, determined
using discounts for lack of marketability, lack of control,
uncertain rights, and ownership of an undesirable mix of
assets. Adams v. United States, 2000-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 60,379 (5th Cir. 2000), aff’g, 99-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 60,340 (N.D. Tax. 1999).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BREEDING FEE . The taxpayers operated a racehorse
raising and racing activity. The taxpayers had entered into a
breeding agreement and claimed the breeding fee as a
current expense. The breeding agreement guaranteed the
taxpayers a live foal. The court held that the breeding fee
had to be capitalized in the cost of the foal, allowing only the
depreciation deduction. See also more on this case under
Hobby Losses, infra. Jordan v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
2000-206.
DISASTER PAYMENTS . On June 23, 2000, the
president determined that certain areas in Wisconsin are
eligible for assistance under the Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, as a result of
severe storms and flooding on May 26, 2000. FEMA-1332-
DR. On June 27, 2000, the President determined that certain
areas in Minnesota are eligible for assistance under the Act
as a result of severe storms on May 17, 2000. FEMA-1333-
DR. On June 27, 2000, the President determined that certain
areas in North Dakota are eligible for assistance under the
Act as a result of severe storms and flooding on June 12,
2000. FEMA-1334-DR. Accordingly, a taxpayer who
sustained a loss attributable to the disasters may deduct the
loss on his or her 1999 federal income tax return.
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayers, husband and wife,
owned a 20 acre farm on which they lived. The taxpayers
owned six broodmares which they used as racehorses. The
taxpayers also intended to breed the horses with other
racehorses owned by other persons and to raise the resulting
foals to be racehorses. The primary source of income was to
be from race purses. The husband had fulltime employment
elsewhere for a modest salary and the wife worked fulltime
at the racehorse activity. The taxpayer did not keep separate
books ut had some written evidence of their claimed
expenses. A major expense for the tax year involved was the
emodeling of a barn. Although the court acknowledged the
nine factors in Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b), the court did not
specifically discuss all of the factors. The court focused
instead on the highly speculative nature of horseracing and
concluded that the taxpayers would have no reason to pursue
the activity without a profit intent; therefore, the court held
that the taxpayers entered into the activity with the intent to
make a profit. However, the court denied a current deduction
for the remodeling costs of the barn, holding that those costs
had to be capitalized and deducted under the depreciation
rule . The court also denied several other expense
ded ctions as not reasonable and necessary to the
horseracing activity. The taxpayers had claimed all of the
mortgage interest as a business deduction, which the court
held was not deductible, even in part, because the
horseracing activity did not have any income in the tax year
involved. Jordan v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-206.
IRA . The IRS has announced a new method to be used for
calculating the net income attributable to IRA contributions
m de after 1999 that are distributed as a returned
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contribution pursuant to I.R.C. § 408(d)(4) or
recharacterized pursuant to I.R.C. § 408A(d)(6). The IRS has
received comments that the old method for calculating net
income attributable to an IRA contribution often did not
reflect the actual earnings and losses of an IRA during the
time it held the contribution, because, under the old method,
account activity in the part of the year that preceded the date
the contribution was made was taken into account in the
calculation of the net income attributable to the contribution.
In addition, IRA owners and other interested parties
indicated that net income should be permitted to be a
negative amount. In response to these comments, the IRS is
providing a new method for calculating net income that
generally bases the calculation of the amount of net income
attributable to a contribution on the actual earnings and
losses of the IRA during the time it held the contribution.
Until further guidance is issued, net income may be
calculated under either the new method or the old method.
Notice 2000-39, I.R.B. 2000-__.
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES . The taxpayer was a
dentist who operated the practice through a personal services
C corporation. The corporation leased the business building
from the taxpayer’s spouse. The lease was started in 1979
and had a term of three years, but at the end of the term the
lease was amended to allow the lease to continue year-to-
year and to give each party the right to terminate the lease
with a 90-day written notice and to allow the rent to be
increased each year. The taxpayers claimed the rental
income from the building as passive income and used the
income to offset passive losses from other sources. The court
held that the regulations in 1993-1994 provided that if the
landlord was the sole shareholder of a C corporation and
materially participated in the corporation’s business, the
rental income from the corporation was nonpassive income.
The court also held that the lease was not exempt from the
regulations as a pre-existing binding contract, because the
lease was unenforceable under state law when the
regulations were promulgated. Connor v. Comm’r, 2000-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,560 (7th Cir. 2000).
RETURNS. The taxpayers, husband and wife, filed a joint
return and listed their minor children as dependants. The
taxpayers, however, did not include any social security
numbers (SSN) for the children because the taxpayers
objected, on religious grounds, to the use of universal
identifiers. The IRS agreed that the religious objection was
sincere and that the minor children were eligible dependants,
but denied the personal exemption for the children, based on
the failure to provide the social security numbers. The
taxpayers argued that they should be allowed to use
individual taxpayer identification numbers (ITIN) for the
children. The court held that the SSN requirement fulfilled a
compelling governmental interest because the use of ITINs
for persons not exempt from social security taxes could
increase the chances of fraudulent returns by persons who
also acquire SSNs. Davis v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-
210.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer held a
25 percent interest in an S corporation which had discharge
of indebtedness income. The corporation was insolvent and
filed for bankruptcy; therefore, the discharge of indebtedness
income was excluded from the corporation’s income under
I. .C. § 108(a). The taxpayer increased the stock basis by
the taxpayer’s share of the discharge of indebtedness
income. The Tax Court cited its holding in Nelson v.
Comm’r, 110 T.C. 114 (1998), to hold that discharge of
indebtedness income excluded from an S corporation’s
income was not passed through to the shareholders to
i crease the basis of stock. The appellate court discussed the
several decisions on both sides of the issue and held that an
S corporation must first use any untaxed discharge of
inde tedness income to reduce tax attributes at the corporate
lev l before passing through any remaining discharge of
indebtedness income to shareholders. In this case, the
corporation had suspended losses which completely offset
the discharge of indebtedness income, leaving no discharge
of indebtedness income to pass through to the shareholders.
In addition, the offset suspended losses were not passed
through to the shareholders. Gaudiano v. Comm’r, 2000-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,559 (6th Cir. 2000), aff’g, T.C.
Memo. 1998-408.
DISREGARD OF  CORPORATION. The taxpayers,
husband and wife, originally formed a partnership which
owned and operated a commercial rental property. In order
to limit their liability for the business, the taxpayers
incorporated the partnership and elected S corporation status.
The taxpayers wanted to transfer the commercial property
and the loan on that property to the S corporation but
decided not to transfer the property because the lender would
have charged them $10,000 for the transfer. However, the S
corporation treated the loan and property as belonging to the
corporation on the corporation’s tax returns for four tax
years.  In the fourth tax year, the taxpayers claimed flow
through losses from the corporation. The IRS disallowed the
losses to the extent the losses exceeded the taxpayers’ bases
in the corporation, excluding the loan amount for the
commercial property because the corporation was not liable
for the loan and did not own the property. The taxpayers
argued that the corporation should be disregarded, with the
operation treated as a partnership, so that the loan amount
was added to their basis in the business. The court held that
the corporation would not be disregarded for federal income
tax purposes because (1) the corporation filed tax returns for
four years and represented on those returns that it owned the
property and was liable on the loan; (2) the corporation had a
business purpose to limit the taxpayers’ tort liability; and (3)
the corporation was not acting as an agent for the taxpayers.
The taxpayers also argued that the IRS was equitably
estopped from denying the corporation’s ownership and loan
liability because the IRS did not object to the corporation’s
first two tax returns. The court held that the IRS was not
precluded from challenging later returns merely because no
challenge was raised in earlier years. Jeyapalan v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 2000-207.
MORE THAN ONE CLASS OF STOCK. The taxpayers
were shareholders in an S corporation with one class of
stock. The corporation issued one share of voting and 10
shares of nonvoting stock for each old share of stock. The
sh reholder rights were the same of each type of stock
except for the voting rights. The IRS ruled that voting and
nonvoti g shares of stock did not create a second class of
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stock for S corporation status purposes. Ltr. Rul.
200026011, Ltr. Rul. 200026012, March 28, 2000.
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
DEFICIENCY PAYMENTS. The debtor had granted a
purchase-money security interest in crops to be grown in
1999 along with the proceeds, insurance proceeds and
government payments from the crop. The crop was planted
but before it was harvested the debtor filed for Chapter 12.
The crop was harvested post-petition and the debtor applied
for and received loan deficiency payments (LDPs) from the
CCC. The debtor argued that the LDP payments was not
subject to the security interest under Section 522 because the
debtor had no right to the LDP until the debtor harvested the
crop post-petition. The court held that the debtor’s right to
participate in the program existed prepetition and was
sufficient right to the payment for the security interest to
attach. In re Otto Farms, Inc., 247 B.R. 757 (Bankr. C.D.
Ill. 2000); In re Klaus, 247 B.R. 761 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
2000).
DISASTER PAYMENTS. The debtors had granted to a
bank a security interest in “the proceeds from any crop
loans, payments, or subsidies paid or guaranteed by any
governmental entity, agency or subdivision.” On April 22,
1999, the FSA issued a report that the debtors were eligible
for crop loss disaster payments for 1998. On May 5, 1999
the debtors filed for Chapter 12 and filed for the disaster
payments after filing the bankruptcy petition. The debtors
argued that the antiassignment provision in the disaster
payment regulations prevented the bank’s security interest
from attaching to the disaster payment. The court held that
federal regulations could not preempt state security interest
law. The debtors also argued that the security interest did not
attach to the proceeds until after the bankruptcy petition;
therefore, the security interest, under Section 552, did not
reach the disaster payment. The court held that the debtors
has sufficient rights in the collateral for the security interest
to attach prepetition. The court held that the FSA report
established the debtors’ right to the disaster payments and
that the post-petition action application was only an
administrative formality to receive the payments. In r
Norville, 248 B.R. 127 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2000).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP OF FARMLAND. The
defendant corporation was owned by one person and
operated a hog confinement facility since 1990. The owner
handled the business strategy, finances, employment,
marketing, herd health and overall management of the
corporation’s business. The day-to-day on-site operations
were the responsibility of a hired manager who lived on the
farm. The manager supervised the employees, execution of
the feeding operations and maintenance of the facility.
Under the Nebraska Constitution, article XII, § 8, for-profit
corporations may not own real estate used for farming unless
an owner of 50 percent or more of the stock either resides on
the farm or engages in the day-to-day labor and management
of the farm. The issue was whether the shareholder engaged
in the day-to-day labor and management of the farm. The
court focused on the activities that took place on the farm,
the feeding, handling and nurturing of the hogs and found
that the shareholder did not participate in these activities;
therefore, the court held that the shareholder did not engage
in the day-to-day labor and management of the farm and the
corporation’s ownership of the farm violated the Nebraska
constitution. The court also rejected the defendant’s
argument that the prohibition violated the Equal Protection
clause of the U.S. Constitution. The court held that the
prohibition was not unconstitutional because it was
rationally related to a legitimate state purpose of promoting
family farming.  Hall v. Progress Pig, Inc., 610 N.W.2d
420 (Neb. 2000).
GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS . The
Colorado Supreme Court has rejected a challenge to a ballot
initiative which would require the legislature to enact laws
and provide funding for the labeling of food containing
genetically modified substances. Brown v. Peckman, No.
00SA194 (Colo. July 3, 2000).
STATE TAXATION
TRUSTS. The taxpayers were the members of one family,
husband and wife and three children. The parents attended a
“financial planning” seminar, purchased a trust kit, and
transferred their 500 acre farm to a trust in exchange for
certificates of beneficial interest for themselves and their
childr n. Much of the farm was then surveyed and
subdivided into residential lots. In reporting gain from the
sale of the lots, the trust determined the tax basis to be the
fair market value of the lots when the farm was transferred
to the trust. The parents continued to operate the farm and
the development of the residential lots and continued to live
on the remaining farm property. The court held that the trust
income was the personal liability of the parents because the
trust was a sham as a business trust, because property was
tra sferre  to the trust in exchange for certificates of
beneficial interest which closely resembled stock, (2) the
certificates of beneficial interest were easily transferable, (3)
the owners of the property continued to exercise substantial
control over the property, and (4) the trust had a continuity
of life more resembling a corporation. The court also
determined that the tax basis of the lots was the basis of the
lots in the hands of the parents prior to the transfer to the
trust. Ruby Mountain Trust v. State, 2000 WL 821727
(Mont. 2000).
CITATION UPDATES
In re Cousins, 209 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2000), rev’g, 238
B.R. 503 (D. N.H. 1999), aff’g, 236 B.R. 119 (Bankr. D.
N.H. 1999) (post-petition interest) see p. 67 supra.
Holland v. United States, 94 F. Supp.2d 787 (S.D. Texas
2000) (court awards and setlements) see p. 94 upra.
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The Agricultural Law Press presents
AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINAR
IN NEW MEXICO
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
August 16-19, 2000 Inn of the Mountain Gods, Mescalero, NM
Come join us for a world-class seminar on the hottest topics in agricultural tax and law. Space is limited for this
wonderful opportunity to gain expert insight into agricultural law and enjoy the many activities offered by this splendid
resort. The resort is very busy at this time of year, so make your reservations early.
The seminar will be Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Saturday, August 16-19, 2000 at the Inn of the Mountain Gods
resort in the south central mountains of New Mexico. Registrants may attend one, two, three or all four days, with separate
pricing for each combination. On Wednesday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch income tax. On Thursday, Dr. Harl
will cover farm and ranch estate tax. On Friday, Roger McEowen will cover farm and ranch business planning. On Saturday,
Roger McEowen will cover current developments in several other areas of agricultural law. Your registration fee includes
comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days attended which will be updated just prior to the seminar. The
seminar materials will also be available on CD-ROM for a small additional charge. Continental buffet breakfasts and break
refreshments are also included in the registration fee.
Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
• Taxation of debt, taxation of bankruptcy, the latest on SE tax of rental of land to a family-owned entity; income
averaging; earned income credit; commodity futures transactions; paying wages in kind.
• Federal estate tax, including 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax, co-ownership discounts, alternate valuation
date, special use valuation, family-owned business deduction (FOBD), handling life insurance, marital deduction planning,
disclaimers, planning to minimize tax over deaths of both spouses, trusts, and generation skipping transfer tax.
• Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden” gifts.
• Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private annuities, self-
canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
• Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited liability
companies.
• Legal developments in farm contracts, secured transactions, bankruptcy, real property, water law, torts, and environmental
law.
Special room discounts are available at the resort. The resort features a variety of splendid guest accommodations and
activities, including horseback riding, golf, sailing, hiking, tennis, fishing, and swimming.
The seminar registration fees  for current subscribers    to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or
Principles of Agricultural Law are $175 (one day), $340 (two days), $490 (three days), and $620 (four days).  The
registration fees for     n nsubscribers    are $195, $380, $550 and $700, respectively. Pleas  Note: the registration fees are
higher for registrations within 30 days prior to the seminar, so please call for availability and the correct fees. A registration
form is available online at www.agrilawpress.com
For more information, call/fax Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or e-mail at robert@agr awpress.com
